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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JUDITH H. DIENES and ! 
DIANNE D. McMAIN, 
Plain,ti"ff s and Appella!nts, 
-vs.-
SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Washington 
corporation, 
DPf Pndant and Respondent. 
) 
Case 
No.11048 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is a suit to recover $10,000 from the de-
fendant insurance company for a double-indemnity life 
insurance risk policy. 
II 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
.T udgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defend-
ant-respondent and against the plaintiffs-appellants "no 
eause of action" was entered on .Tune 15, 1967. 
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III 
RELIEF BEING SOUGHT ON APPgAL 
Appellants are asking the Supreme Court to reverse 
the lower court by sending the matter hack for a new 
trial, with direction to the lower court to modify its in-
structions to the jury. The jury should be instructed that 
plaintiff is entitled to recover without being required to 
prove that the death of the insured resulted solely from 
external injuries suffered in the auto accident. Appel-
lants contend their requested instruction No. 19 is a 
correct interpretation of the insurance policy language 
involved and of the law of Utah. 
v 
MATERIAL FACTS 
The life of Louis S. DiEnes, the husband and father 
of the appellants, was insured by respondent for $10,000 
by an accidental death and dismemberment policy. (Ex-
hibit 1-P, Complaint and Answer R-1 and R-3.) Appel-
lants submitted proof of death in the form of a certi-
fied copy of "Certificate of Dea.th" of Louis S. DiEnes, 
and made demand on respondent for the payment of the 
$10,000 accidental death and dismemberment benefits, 
which respondent refused to pay. (Complaint and An-
swer R-1 and R-3.) This lawsuit by appellants was filed 
to compei respondent to pay the $10,000. 
The policy language with which we are concerned 
reads as follows : 
"ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT 
BENEFITS - Subject to the Pxclm;ion provision, if 
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any employee, while insured by this policy and 
prior to retirement, sustains bodily injuries ef-
fected solely through external, violent and acci-
dental means, and as a result thereof, suffers 
within 90 days one of the following losses, Lifeco 
Insurance Company of America will pay the ap-
plicable amount specified in the Schedule of In-
surance for Accidental Death and Dismember-
ment Insurance, or one-half such amount, as indi-
cated: 
1. For loss of life, the full amount''; 
• • 
'' ExcLusrnNs - No Benefits under this Acci-
dental Death and Dismemberment provision shall 
be paid for accidental death or dismemberment 
caused by: 
1. Disease or bodily or mental infirmity, or 
medical or surgical treatment thereof, ptomaine 
or bacterial infection (except infections occurring 
through an accidental cut or wound); or" 
• • 
It was stipulated that the name of the company in 
the policy, to-wit, "Lifeco," had been amended to 
"Safeco." (R-67) 
On the morning of August 4, 1965, Mr. Louis S. Di-
Enes was involved in an automobile accident. He was 
injured and after some delay at the accident scene he 
was taken to the hospital (R-71). He had a through 
and through laceration to his nose, abrasions on both 
knees, and hit his stomach fairly hard. (Emergency Rec-
ord Exhibit 3-d.) Mr. DiEnes was a high-keyed indi-
vidual, very tense, and very significantly upset over the 
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happening of the accident (R-81). He was given an elec-
trocardiogram and prepared for corrective nose surgery 
(R-81). The electrocardiogram showed no substantial 
changes from the previous one of some two months ear-
lier (R-82). 
Mr. DiEnes had suffered a myocardial infarction in 
1962, due to arteriosclerotic heart disease; he had been 
admitted to the hospital for coronary insufficiency in 
June, 1965; the autopsy performed after his death 
showed an extreme degree of coronary sclerosis with 
marked narrowing of the lumen due to both sclerosis 
and thrombosis; Mr. DiEnes had responded well to medi-
cation a.nd therapy following his previous two admissions 
to the hospital in March, 1962, and .June of 1965; how-
ever, at approximately 1 :10 a.m. on August 5, he passed 
away (R-86, 87 and Exhibit 2-P). The death certificate 
which was completed by Dr. Smith, his own physician 
(who participated in the autopsy) listed the immediate 
cause of death as 
(a) Acute coronary insufficiency 
(h) Due to recent auto accident 
( c) Due to severe artereiosclfrotic heart dis-
ease (underlying cause listed last) 
(Exhibit 2-P admitted in evidence R-86 although not 
stamped ''admitted'' by clerk.) 
Dr. Smith testified that the last time he saw Mr. Di-
Enes alive he was much concerned about how keyed-up 
and tense and disturbed he was. .Mr. DiEnes wanted to 
go home, hut because of his extreme tension, Dr. Smith 
insisted that he stay in the hospital (R.-84). 
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Dr. Smith testified at the trial that he believed that 
the automobile accident was a direct contributing factor 
to Mr. DiEnes' final heart attack (R-87). When he was 
asked to explain this statement, Dr. Smith testified: 
"It has been proved that he had a serious 
heart disease prior to the accident. He was in 
the hospital as a direct result of the accident. The 
accident itself, seemingly, was - to an ordinary 
individual - of minor consequences; but, as far 
as Mr. DiEnes was concerned with the type of 
medical problem that we were treating him for, 
the accident was definitely the final contributing 
factor to his death." (R-87) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Smith testified that in Mr. 
DiEnes' condition any episode of serious anxiety could 
very likely have caused him to expire (R-97). 
On redirect examination, Dr. Smith testified that 
anxiety was not good for Mr. DiEnes (R-97). When 
asked whether he had an opinion, medically, as to what 
caused Mr. DiEnes' anxiety on August 4, Dr. Smith re-
sponded, "\Vell, it was definitely a result of the auto 
arcident." (R-98) 
Dr. Carlquist, the pathologist who performed the 
autopsy on Mr. DiEnes, testified at length as to the se-
riousness of Mr. DiEnes' heart problems and circulation 
problems (R-104, 110). He described them as acute, 
marked, with the lumen in the left aorta almost complete-
ly clotted and only a tiny opening that would represent 
R bout fi,·e percent of the former total opening; the heart 
muscle was also in a state of degeneration (R-106, 108). 
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Dr. Carlquist testified that in his opinion the cause 
of Mr. DiEnes' death was his severe cardiac damage, se-
vere heart disease (R-114, 115). 
Nevertheless, Dr. Carlquist did not have an opinion 
whether Mr. DiEnes' death occurred as a result of the 
external violent and accidental bodily injuries suffered 
by Mr. DiEnes in the August 4 automobile accident 
(R-114). When pressed on recross-examination, Dr. Carl-
quist testified as follows: 
Q. "Doctor, do you exclude, completely, from this 
consideration the fact of the automobile acci-
dent? 
A. No, sir; I have no way of tying it to-together 
-as far as my autopsy was concerned. 
Q. Do you take the position that the automobile 
accident is wholly inconsequential, insofar as 
his death is concerned1 
A. No, I don't- didn't mean to imply that - by 
my "yes" or "no" answers. I mean, I simply 
meant to imply I don't know what relationship 
was beitween the accident and his death. 
Q. Do you exclude the accident as a causative 
factor? 
A. No." 
Appellants and respondent differed in the lower 
court as to the construction of the policy. The court de-
clined to take sides by refusing to instruct the jury on 
the legal theory of either counsel. Instead, the court in-
structed the jury in the language of the policy. The court 
further instructed appellants' counsel that he would not 
permit him to argue tha:t the insuring agreement was am-
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bignous, and in argument to the jnry, counsel would be 
re~tricted to the precise language of the court's instruc-
tion No. 15 (R-139, 140). Appellants' counsel was denied 
permission to present to the jury his construction of the 
policy language as reflected in appe1lants' proposed in-
struction No. 19 (R-60 and R-137, 138). 
In summation to the jury, respondent's counsel read 
the court's instruction No. 15 and stated to the jury that 
plaintiffs could not recover unless they had proved that 
the death of DiEnes resulted solely from injuries effected 
through external, violent and accidental means (R-140). 
Appellants interrupted argument at this point and made 
objection to the court (R-140). 
A timely motion for new trial was filed by appel-
lant::>, supported by an affidavit of counsel. Respondent's 
counsel also filed an affidavit. We quote in full the mo-
tion and both affidavits as the best possible resume of the 
differences between appellants and the lower court: 
"MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 163708 
Plaintiffs move the court to set aside the ver-
dict of the jury returned herein on June 15, 1967, 
and to grant a new trial because of errors of law 
as follows: 
1. The Court erred in refusing to give to the 
jury plaintiffs' requested instructions numbered 
16, 17, 18 and particularly instruction number 19. 
2. The Court erred in instructing the jury by 
giYing its instruction numbered 15 for the reason 
and on the ground that instruction number 15 
does not determinr the law of this case and leaves 
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it up to the jury to determine the law, and for 
the further reason that instruction number 15 
does not recite that the bodily injuries suffered 
by Mr. DiEnes were affected solely through ex-
ternal, violent and accidental means, a. fact which 
wa.s not in dispute, and which plaintiffs specifi-
cally requested in chambers before the Court gave 
its instructions to the jury. 
3. The Court erred in refusing to determine 
the law of the case and instruct the jury thereon, 
the Court having stated in chambers that it would 
remain neutral with respect to the dispute be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant on the con-
struction of ,the language of the policy. 
4. Counsel for the defendant conducted him-
self improperly in arguing to the jury that in or-
der for plaintiffs to recover they had to prove that 
the death of decedent was solely the result of 
injuries affected through external, violent and 
accidental means and the Court did not admonish 
counsel or instruct the jury to disregard such 
statements. 
5. The Court erred in advising counsel for the 
plaintiffs in chambers that he would not permit 
counsel to argue his theory of the case as recited 
in plaintiffs' proposed instruction number 19, and 
that plaintiffs' counsel would be restricted to 
arguing from the precise language of the Court's 
instruction number 15. 
This motion is based on the records and pro-
ceedings in this action, and the affidavit attached 
hereto. · 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGU-M 
By /s/ MAx K. MANGUM 
Attorneys for Plwintiffs" 
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''AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 163708 
STATE OF UTAH } 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ss 
MAX K. MANGUM, being first sworn upon 
his oath deposes and says : 
That on June 15, 1967, in chambers of Judge 
Merrill Faux, and before the jury had been in-
structed in the case of DiEnes v. Safeco Life ln-
su:ra!IUJe Co., the following took place without a 
court reporter being present: 
1. The Court advised counsel that he would 
not instruct the jury on plaintiffs' theory of the 
law, and that plaintiffs' requested instructions 
numbered 16, 17, 18 and 19 would not be given. 
2. The Court advised counsel that he would 
not give defendant's requested instructions num-
bered 6 or 7. 
3. The Court advised counsel that he would re-
main neutral on the construction of the language 
of the policy, and would therefore instruct the 
jury by using the precise language of the policy, 
which was done by the court's instruction No. 15. 
4. The Court in response to a direct question 
from affiant whether affiant would be permitted to 
argue his theory of the case as recited in plain-
tiff's requested instruction number 19, was ad-
vised that summation to the jury must be restrict-
ed to the language of the court's instructions. 
Counsel for the defendant, nevertheless, stated to 
the jury on two separate occasions that plaintiffs 
could not recover unless they proved that the 
death of Mr. DiEnes was solely the result of in-
juries effected through external, violent and acci-
dental means. Despite objection by plaintiffs' 
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counsel, the Court did not admonish counsel for 
the defendant, nor did he instruct the jury to 
disregard such statements. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
/s/ MAx K. MANGUM 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd 
day of June, 1967. 
/s/ JANE ROBERTS 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, 
Utah.'' 
My commission expires : 
April 9, 1969 
"AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 163708 
STATE OF UTAH } 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ss 
REX J. HANSON being first duly sworn de-
poses and says: 
That on June 15, 1967, before the jury was 
instructed, the court's proposed instructions were 
discussed between Court and counsel in chambers. 
Counsel for plaintiffs contended that the insuring 
agreement of the insurance policy was ambiguous 
in that the words ''effected solely through exter-
nal, violent and accidental means'' could reason-
ably be construed rto apply to injuries sustained 
by the insured and not his death. The court was 
of the opinion that the proYision was not ambig-
uous and stated that he would instruct the jury 
using said words in the insuring agreement. 'rlw 
court advised plaintiffs' counsel that he would 
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not permit him to argue that the insuring agree-
ment was ambiguous and that in his argument to 
the jury, plaintiffs' counsel would he governed by 
the law as stated in the court's instructions. Af-
fiant does not recall and therefore denies that the 
court said he would remain neutral in the matter 
except that the court did say that he would not in-
struct the jury on the legal theory of either coun-
sel, but would instruct the jury in accordance with 
the wording of the insurance policy. After the dis-
cussion, the Reporter was called into chambers 
and both counsel took some exceptions to the 
court's proposed instructions reserving the right 
to take additional exceptions after the jury had 
retired. 
In summation to the jury, affiant read the 
court's Instruction No. 15, and stated to the jury 
that plaintiffs could not recO\'er unless they had 
proved that the death of DiEnes resulted solely 
from injuries effected through external, violent 
and accidental means, which was objected to by 
counsel for the plaintiffs but no request was made 
to the court to admonish the jury or for a mis-
trial. It is affiant 's position that his statement to 
the jury was supported by the evidence and in 
accordance with the law given in the Instructions. 
Is/ REX J. HANSON 
REX J. HANSON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th 
day of July, 1967. 
/s/ DIANE M. MARTIN 
Notary Public - Residing 
at Salt Lake City, Utah 
1\Iy Commission Expires August 17, 1969." 
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VI 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
UNDER THE INSURING LANGUAGE OF 
THE DIENES POLICY, INSURED'S DEATH 
NEED NOT HAVE RESULTED SOLELY 
FROM THE INJURIES INCURRED BY EX-
TERNAL, VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL 
MEANS, BUT MUST HA VE OCCURRED AS 
A RESULT OF THESE IN JURIES IN ORDER 
FOR APPELLANTS TO RECOVER. 
Respondent took the position throughout the trial 
that appellants could not recover since decedent's heart 
disease was at least a contributing cause of his death. To 
restate the same proposition, respondent always insisted 
that appellants had to prove that the death of Mr. 
DiEnes resulted solely from injuries effected through ex-
ternal, violent and accidental means in order to recover. 
Appellants contend that they may recover if Mr. DiEnes' 
death occurred as a result of injuries effected solely 
through external violent and accidental means. This dif-
ference is the whole crux of the case. Appellants con-
cede without argument that the evidence conclusively 
shows that the diseased heart of Mr. DiEnes was a con-
curring cause of his death, but we deny the obligation to 
prove that his death was the sole result of the injuries. If 
appellants are wrong on this issue, your opinion should 
dismiss our appeal. 
On the other hand, if we are right on this point, then 
the lower court committed reversihle error by refusing 
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to properly instruct the jury on appellant's theory of the 
law of this case. 
The accidental death and dismemberment clauses in 
the policy read as follows insofar as they are applicable 
to the issues in this case: 
"ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT 
BENEFITS - Subject to the exclusion, if any em-
ployee, while insured by this policy and prior to 
retirement, sustains bodily injuries effected sole-
ly through external, violent and accidental means, 
and as a result thereof, suffers within 90 days one 
of the following losses, Lif eco Insurance Com-
pany of America will pay the applicable amount 
specified in the Schedule of Insurance for Acci-
dental Death and Dismemberment Insurance, or 
one-half such amount, as indicated: 
1. For loss of life, the full amount; 
It is significant to note that the controlling language 
of this policy simply requires that bodily injuries sus-
tained solely through external, violent and accidental 
means must be present. The policy does not require that 
death, the result of bodily injuries, be solely due to the 
accident but instead merely provides that as a result of 
the accidental bodily injuries, if death ensues, the lia-
bility follows. Thus, the first real question to be deter-
mined is whether the injuries or the death must be solely 
attributable to accidental means. It should be kept in 
mind that in case of doubt because of the language used 
in the policy, the doubt must he resolved against the in-
surance carrier and in favor of the insured. 
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A case which discussed this distinction aml which 
recognized that la11guage similar to the language in this 
case requires only that the bodily injuries be sustained 
solely through accidental means is Standard Li/ e lnsur-
a~ice Company v. Foster (1950), 210 Miss. 242, 49 S.2d 
391. Foster sustained injuries by being struck by a m-0-
tor vehicle on November 18, sustaining a fractured ankle 
and multiple rib fractures. He died on the following 
Dec. 1. The attending physician's certificate filed with 
the Bureau of Vital Statistics, and received in evidence 
as prima facie proof of the facts therein recited, listed 
the fractures and also stated that the death was "not 
due to external causes." Defendant contended insured 
died of epilepsy. 
The insurance policy language involved in the Fos-
ter case reads that the insurance company ''hereby in-
sures the person named in the policy against the result 
of bodily injuries received during the time this policy is 
in force, and affected solely by external violent and 
accidental means.'' 
The unanimous decision by the Chief Justice of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court is so clear on the precise 
dispute now before this court that we quote from this 
decision: 
''Therefore, under the foregoing testimony we 
are of the opinion that it was a question for the 
jury as to whether or not the death of the insured 
was the proximate result of bodily injuries, which 
were effected solely hy external violent and acci-
dental means. In fact, there could be no question 
but that the bodily injuries ~were received and ef-
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fected solely by external, violent and accidental 
means, and if there is any doubt as to whether 
the provision of the policy means that the bodily 
injuries must be effected solely by external, vio-
lent and accidental means, instead of meaning 
that the death must be effected solely by such 
means, then the doubt would have to be resolved 
in favor of the insured * * * '' 49 So. 2d at 395. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Mississippi court then points out the different 
result which will follow when policy language is used 
which insures against the effects resulting directly and 
e.r.:dusively of all other causes from bodily injury sus-
tained solely through accidental means. (Compare with 
the language used in the policy in the Tucker case (Utah) 
discussed at page 20 herein.) 
The Mississippi court concluded that the insurance 
clause in the Foster case (language almost identical to 
the instant case) only requires that the bodily injuries 
shall be received and effected solely by external, Yiolent 
and accidental means and that the death must occur 
as a result thereof. 
It should be pointed out that the DiEnes policy does 
not provide, as it could by the choice of the insurer, that 
the liability is excluded if death was caused or contrib-
1tfed to directly or indirectly or wholly or partially by 
disease or by bodily infirmity. 
rl'his court has held that an insurance policy, while 
it is a written contract, is not one which is negotiated 
lictween the parties. These policy contracts are prepared 
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in advance by the insurance company. This court has held 
that there must be a liberal construction of all the terms 
in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for 
which the insurance was taken out and for which the pre-
mium was paid. See Browning v. Equitablr Life Assur-
arnce Society, 72 P.2<l 1060, 94 Ut. 532, and see written 
opinion denying the rehearing, which is reported in 80 
P.2d 349, 94 Ut. 570. 
Respondents will undoubtedly place reliance upon 
the exclusionary clause in the DiEnes policy, but again 
it should be noted that the clause simply provides that no 
benefits under this accidental death and dismemberment 
provision shall be paid for accidental death or dismem-
berment caused by disease or bodily or mental infirm-
ity. The authors of the policy could very easily have pro-
vided in the exclusionary clause that liability is excluded 
if death was caused or contributed to directly or indi-
rectly or icholly or partially by disease or by bodily i11-
firmity. They did not elect to use this type of exclusion-
ary language and they cannot, theorefore, at this point 
be permitted to assert that the sanw results can he 
achieved by a forced construction of the language which 
they did use. Furthermore, the exclusionary clause can-
not be interpreted in such a manner as to completely 
negate the language of the insuring clause. The two 
clauses must be construed as a whole, not piecemeal. 
There are, of course, hundreds of cases construing 
insurance policies and many courts have allowed reeov-
ery even though there is a diseased or bodily infirmit~' 
present where an accidental injur~' triggers or influences 
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or controls the conditions which existed at the time of 
the injury and which set in motion the prior disease or 
bodily infirmity so that death ensues. Recovery has been 
allowed in many cases notwithstanding the fact that a 
pre-existing disease has contributed to the death. Again 
the controlling point is the language used by the authors 
of the policy. 
This court in Browning held that when a diseased con-
dition is set in motion as the result of an injury, the disa-
bility or death is deemed the proximate result of the in-
jury and not of the disease as an independent cause. The 
intervening cause which follows as a natural, though not 
necessary, consequence of accidental injury, cannot, there-
fore, be considered an independent cause. The court in 
Browning pointed out that an intervening cause set in 
motion by accidental injury is a result of the accident and 
not au independent cause. Justice Wolfe in his concur-
ring opinion in Griff·in, v. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Ut. 563, 
133 P.2d 333, at 339, adopted this same view of the law. 
The DiEnes policy clause before the Court in this 
case does not provide that recovery shall be had only if 
110 other circumstance than the accident contributes to the 
<leath either proximately or remotely, directly or indi-
rectly, wholly or in part. This court in the Browning 
case recognized this legal point and commented on the 
problem of language choice as it affects the legal results. 
In Brownin_q, this court also said that when an in-
sured claims a right to recover under the accident pro-
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visions of a policy (accidental death clause) all he need 
do is bring himself within the field therein defined and 
show that the injury was proximately eansed through 
violent, external and accidental means. He is not re-
quired to show that there were 110 latent causes or other 
conditions which might have contributed to the result, 
indirectly or in part. When he brings himself within the 
insuring clause he has made his case and any excep-
tions, exclusions or conditions "·hich would then deny 
him relief are matters of defense mid the burden there-
of rests upon the insurer. 
Broicning also noted that in a case starting with bod-
ily injury all morbid changes in the exercise of vital func-
tions which result from or are induced by such injury 
should be regarded as the effect thereof and not as an 
independent cause. When death results from such mor-
bid change so resulting from or inducrd by such injury, 
the injury and not the morbid change indured by it is the 
cause of death. Beginning with a primary cause condi-
tions induced by such cause are e>fforts thereof and every 
condition so induced must be corn:;idNed in relation 
thereto as an effect and not a ca use. 
Interpreting these points made in the B nncning case. 
if the acute coronary insufficiency, 'vhich was the imme-
diate cause of Mr. DiEnes' death, was set in motion b:· 
the accident or if the coronary insufficiency was con-
trolled, directed or influenced in its action or behavior 
by the accident, then the coronary insufficiency was a re-
sult of the aceident and not an i11<1epe11dent cause of 
death. 
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In Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 82 P.2d 178, 95 
Ut. 445, Justice Wolfe recognized the "thin skull" rule 
as operative in Utah. He said the "insurer takes the in-
sured 'as is' and if the accident by operating on that 
particular person actually set in motion causes which 
would not have been set in motion in a normal person 
but which produced the final result, it is a reasonable 
construction of the policy to hold that the accident was 
the direct and only cause of the final result." 
In the Lee case, Lee had been suffering from gall 
bladder trouble which had apparently become dormant. 
Lee suffered a severe blow which ruptured the gall blad-
der, infection followed, and then death. The policy paid 
double indemnity if death of the insured resulted "di-
rectly and independently of au other cwuse from bodily 
injury effected solely through external violent and acci-
dental causes." (emphasis added) The opinion of the 
court held ''that where an accidental injury sets in mo-
tion or starts activity of a latent or dormant disease 
and such disease contributes to the death after having 
been so precipitated by the accident, the disease is not a 
direct or indirect cause of death, nor a contributing cause 
within the meaning of the policy, but the accident which 
started the mischief and precipitated the condition re-
sulting in death is the sole cause of death." 
We repeat that there is no language in the DiEnes 
policy that if death results directly a<nd independently of 
all other causes from bodily injuries then and only then 
is the insurer liable. Thus appellants' burden in this case 
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is not so onerous as plaintiff had in the Lee case, where 
plaintiff prevailed despite the stringent policy language. 
Another Utah case is worthy of comment in this 
brief. We refer to Tucker v. New York Life lnBurancc 
Company, 107 Utah 478, 155 P.2d 173. The poliey lan-
guage in the Tucker case reads "New York Life Insur-
ance Company agrees to pay to the beneficiaries $1,000, 
the face of this policy, upon reeeipt of due proof of the 
dea:th of Garber M. Nichols, the insured; or double the 
face of this policy upon receipt of due proof that the 
death of the insured resulted directly and independently 
of all other causes from bodily injury affected solely 
through external, violent and accidental ca.use, and that 
such death occurred within 60 days after sustaining such 
injury." (Emphasis added) The exclusion clause of this 
policy reads: ''This double irtdemnity benefit will not 
apply if the insured 's death resulted from physical or 
mental infirmities; or directly or indirectly from illness 
or disease of any kind.'' The evidence in the Tucker case 
clearly showed that the accident set in motion forces 
which increased the blood pressure of the deceased which, 
working on a pathological condition, to-wit: a weakened 
main artery because of prolonged high blood pressure, 
caused his death. The ruling of the court was obviously 
controlled by the policy language which paid the double 
indemnity amo1mt only if the death resulted directly and 
independently of all other causes from the bodily injury. 
Since the death in the Tucker case resulted from a com-
bination of circumstances, the policy language prevented 
payment. Again we repeat, therp, is no requirement in 
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the DiEnes policy that death result directly a;nd inde-
pendently of all other clllUSes from the injuries or acci-
de11.t. Certainly, Titcker should not control this case as 
the policy language there was radically different. It is 
ne,·ertheless interesting and at the same time disturbing 
to note that the lower court felt that the Tucker case was 
controlling and that the language was different without 
any real distinction in a reasonable interpretation of·it. 
(R-128) 
Another Utah ca.se which discusses some of the prob-
lems which are present in this case is Griff in v. Pruden~ 
ti.al Insurance Compamy, 102 Ut. 563, 133 P.2d 333. 
Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion cites cases 
which establish that the true question is whether the 
deceased would have died at the time he did die if 
he ha.d not received the injuries in the auto accident. The 
mere fact that the auto accident hastened death by ag-
gravating a heart condition so that deceased only lived a 
few hours when, even if he had not had the auto acci-
dent and consequent injuries, he might not have lived as 
much as a month, would not def eat recovery under the 
language of the DiEnes policy. If the coronary ins~f­
ficieney which Mr. DiEnes suffered was a result of the 
auto aceident injuries, even though Mr. DiEnes had a dis-
eased heart, recovery may be had under the language of 
this policy. The Griff·in case also made clear the fact that 
the insurer has burden of proof that death was c.aused 
by exceptions to the risk insured against. Thus, if the 
defendant el aims that death was within the exclusion 
dause, then the defendant has the burden of proving this 
with a preponderance of the evidence. 
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Dr. Curtis, a fully qualified lwart specialist who 
never did testify that he ever saw or treated Mr. DiEues, 
but who merely reviewed the written medical hospital 
and autopsy reports of Mr. DiEnes, was the only expert 
witness who testified that the accidental injuries had no 
connection with the death of Mr. DiEnes (R-116, 125). 
Nevertheless, Dr. Curtis was not prepared to predict Mr. 
DiEnes' life expectancy at the time of the accident, al-
though he did say that Mr. DiEnes had already lived 
longer than one would expect ( R-125). Dr. Curtis did 
testify that anxiety such as Mr. DiEnes had was a factor 
in his heart problem, and that it could be a precipitating 
factor to bring on a second, third or fourth heart prob-
lem (R. 124, 125). Dr. Curtis, who never knew or treat-
ed Mr. DiEnes, and who did not participate in the au-
topsy, nevertheless expressed his opinion (not supported 
by the other experts whose information 'vent far beyond 
a mere revie~w of a paper record) that anxiety from the 
auto accident was not a factor in l\Ir. DiEnes' death. 
Under appellants' theory of the law of this case, Dr. 
Curtis' testimony at most made a jury question as to 
whether Mr. DiEnes died as a result of the accidental 
injuries. However, we point out again that under the 
ruling of the court we were forbidden to argue our theory 
of the law as it would apply to Dr. Curtis' testimony. 
POINT 2 
THE LOWER COURT OONIMITTED REVER-
SIBLE ]JRROR BY REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY ON APPl<JLLANTS' 
THEORY OF THI~ LA Vv OF THIS CASE. 
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Appellants took exception to the refusal of the court 
to give their requested instructions numbered 16, 17, 18 
and 19. Appellants also took exception to instruction No. 
15 as given by the court. 
Appellants' requested instructions numbered 16, 17, 
18 and 19 as submitted to the lower court were as follows: 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
''You are instructed that from the undisputed 
testimony in this case Mr. DiEnes did in fact suf-
fer an acute coronary insufficiency on August 5, 
1965, which was the immediate cause of his death. 
You must determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence whether the acute coronary insufficiency 
was set in motion by accidental injuries sustained 
by Mr. DiEnes, or whether the acute coronary in-
sufficiency was controlled, directed or influenced 
in its action or behavior by accidental injuries 
sustained by Mr. DiEnes. If you find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the acute coron-
ary insufficiency was set in motion, controlled, di-
rected or influenced by accidental injuries to Mr. 
DiEnes, then you may find that the coronary in-
sufficiency and death were a result of the accident, 
and not the independent cause of the death of 
Mr. DiEnes." 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
''Starting with a bodily injury, all morbid 
changes in the exercise of vital functions which re-
sult from or are induced by such injury should be 
regarded as the effect thereof and not as inde-
pendent causes. \Vhen death results from any 
such morbid change so resulting from or induced 
by such injury, the injury and not the morbid 
change induced by it, is the cause of death. Be-
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ginning with a primary cause, conditions induced 
by such cause and effects thereof, and every con-
dition so induced must be considered in relation 
thereto as an effect and not as a cause.'' 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
"You are instructed that when an insurance 
company insures the life of an individual with an 
accidental double indemnity policy, that the insur-
ance company takes that individual 'as he is.' 
If an accident by operating on that particular in-
sured individual actually sets in motion causes 
which would not have been set in motion in a nor-
mal person but which, nevertheless, resulted in 
the death of the insured, it is a reasonable con-
struction of the policy to hold that the death was 
the direct result of the accident." 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
"You are instructed that under the terms of 
the policy involved in this case, the deceased, Mr. 
DiEncs, must have: 
1. Sustained bodily injuries effected solely 
through extenial violent and accidental means in 
order to recover, and 
2. As a result of such injuries, his death must 
have occurred within ninety days. 
The death need not have resulted solely from 
the injuries incurred by external, violent and acci 
dental means, but must have occurred as a result 
of these injuries in order for plaintiffs to recover." 
Instruction number 15 as given by the court was as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
''In order to prove the essential elements of 
plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them to es tab-
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lish by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
case the following proposition: That the death 
of Louis DiEnes was a result of bodily injuries 
effected solely through external, violent and acci-
dental means.'' 
Instruction No. 15 ignores the dispute between the 
litigants and simply uses the policy language itself. The 
court did nothing to clarify the opposite positions taken 
by counsel throughout the trial, except that the court di-
rectly instructed appellants' counsel in chambers that he 
was not at liberty to argue that the insuring agreement 
was ambiguous, and in his arguments to the jury, 
coWlsel was to be governed by the court's instruction 
(R-137, 140). 
Despite this, counsel for respondents states that: 
"In his summation to the jury affiant read 
the court's instruction No. 15, and stated to the 
jury that plaintiffs could not recover unless they 
had proved that the death of DiEnes resulted 
solely from injuries effected through external, vio-
lent, and accidental means." (R-140 Affidavit of 
respondent's counsel filed in connection with ap-
pellants' Motion for a New Trial.) (Emphasis 
added) 
Objection was made to these remarks at the very 
time they were uttered, but the court did not admonish 
counsel nor instruct the jury to disregard such com-
ments (R-138). 
At no time throughout the entire trial was coWlsel 
for appellants ever permitted to state in the presence of 
the jury, that appellants were entitled to :recover if 
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death resulted from a combination of factors, or that 
the death of Mr. DiEnes need not have resulted solely 
from injuries incurred in the accident. Appellants were 
forced to try the case and argue to the jury on the prem-
ise of the trial court that if the heart condition of Mr. 
DiEnes was a contributing factor in his death, then ap-
pellants eould not recover (R-100). 
In the absence of the right to discuss this matter 
with the jury, it was obvious that they could only reach 
one verdict, ''no cause of action. '' The evidence con-
clusively showed that Mr. DiEnes' diseased heart was a 
concurring cause of his death. Unless appellants were 
accorded the right to argue their construction of the in-
surance policy language, they never had a chance to pre-
vail. This, we say, was reversible error. 
There can be no dispute that Mr. DiEnes sustained 
"bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent 
and accidental means'' (the precise language of the pol-
icy, Exhibit 1-P). Nevertheless, the court refused to so 
instruct the jury despite a specific request to do so 
(R-131). Appellants requested the court to preface its 
instruction No. 15 with the statement that there is no 
dispute about the fact that Mr. DiEnes suffered bodily 
injuries effected solely through external, violent and acci-
dental means. An exception was taken to this refusal by 
the court (R-131). 
Under the authorities cited and discussed in pages 
12 to 22 herein, appellants' theor~- of the law should 
have been given as requested in instructions 16, 17, 18 
and particularly number 19. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants believe that their requested instruction 
No. 19 sums up their entire contentions in this case and 
we therefore close this brief by again quoting this re-
quested instruction: 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
"You are instructed that under the terms of 
the policy involved in this case, the deceased, Mr. 
DiEnes, must have: 
1. Sustained bodily injuries effected solely 
through external violent and accidental means in 
order to recover, and 
2. As a result of such injuries, his death must 
have occurred within ninety days. 
The death need not have resulted solely from 
the injuries incurred by external, violent and acci-
dental means, but must have occurred as a result 
of these injuries in order for plaintiffs to recover." 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUM 
By 1\fax K. MANGUM 
Attorneys for Plain.tiffs-
A ppella;n.ts 
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